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Summary
The focus of this comparative study is on the use of soft power in the digital 
public diplomacy of two Global South players, Brazil and India, in EU mem-
ber states. The main objective of this research is to find out how their embas-
sies use digital diplomacy in communication through their official websites 
and to identify which soft power resources they dominantly use. Quantitative 
content analysis and thematic analysis were used to analyze the categories and 
subcategories on the main menu and special banners on each embassy’s home 
page, and the associated content. Unlike the Indian embassies, which fully 
embraced digital diplomacy 2.0, the Brazilian embassies do not utilize the full 
potential of digital diplomacy and primarily remain reliant on websites only. 
According to this research, the Brazilian embassies in the EU use film as a 
dominant soft power resource in their digital diplomacy, while the Indian em-
bassies use yoga as a powerful diplomatic tool. Still, both approaches are not 
enough to attract European publics. There remains a lot of space for improve-
ment and better usage of soft power resources and digital public diplomacy 
potentials in communicating the powers of Brazil and India in EU countries.
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Introduction
For the majority of non-Western, rising economic powers, public diplomacy is 
recognized as a tool to move upwards in the global order. Melissen writes about 
the ‘rising Rest’, thinking of the BRIC’s (Brazil, Russia, India, and China),1 the 
1 In 2003 analysts at Goldman Sachs came up with the acronym “BRIC’s economies”, or econo-
mies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. They foresaw that in less than 40 years the BRIC 
states would catch up with the leading economies of the world thus becoming the “new engine 
of growth consumer power”. However, the term cannot be understood as an analytical category 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, 2021, pp. 113-140
114
MIKT’s (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey), and the other emerging 
economies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, which “in an international environ-
ment of tectonic power shifts” have and present an intense interest in public diplo-
macy (Melissen, 2013, p. 7). A strategically communicated public image, which is a 
tool of power, can help generate better political recognition, better market position, 
and finally better profits (Ballerini, 2020).
In the mobile, networked and information-saturated 21st century, communica-
tion patterns changed dramatically. The focus is no longer on the information itself, 
but on the stories with “the most compelling narrative” which sell and “win the 
day” (Copeland, 2013, p. 1). Because of these changes, the nature of public diplo-
macy changed as well in its purpose to make a state noticed by other countries, or 
remain unnoticed, depending on its political goals. It is often stressed that foreign 
ministries and foreign services need reform and that “the new diplomacy has been 
driven by the adoption, within diplomatic institutions and government more gene-
rally, of digitally-based systems of data creation, transmission, and storage using 
the Internet, social media platforms, computers, and a variety of wireless electronic 
devices” (Ibid.).
The “economic risers” of the Western hemisphere, such as Brazil, are “frus-
trated that overseas publics see only the divisions in their societies rather than their 
economic successes” (Melissen, 2013, p. 7). The same is true with India, which is 
envisioned in the West through stereotypes of a backward poor country known for 
its malnutrition, human rights violations, and not as a civilization of great impor-
tance (Singh, 2012, as cited in Malhotra, 2015, p. 5).
The main objective of this research is to find out how emerging Global South 
powers, Brazil and India, the members of BRICS and trilateral diplomatic partner-
ship of India, Brazil, and South African Republic (IBSA),2 practice public diplo-
macy in the EU in years 2018 and 2019, i.e., how they brand their country and com-
municate with European citizens through the official websites of their embassies in 
since BRIC states greatly differ from one another in matters of internal politics, international 
goals, and economic structures. The South African Republic joined the group in 2010, making it 
from then on forward BRICS (Kos-Stanišić, 2010, p. 18).
2 IBSA is an acronym coined in the beginning of the 21st century which refers to trilateral part-
nership of India, Brazil, and South African Republic. This trilateral diplomatic partnership was 
launched in June of 2003 during the meeting of foreign affairs ministers in Brasilia based on 
premises of joint interests, with the aim of coordinating actions regarding the trade and security 
issues on the global level. The identity of South (geographically speaking of South Asia, South 
America, and South Africa) which IBSA emphasizes closely reminds of the nonalignment. Alas, 
IBSA’s regional identity of the South was not recognized by the international community, espe-
cially not by the West. They consider IBSA as a community of “emerging countries”, not as col-
lective representatives of the South and its interests (Kos-Stanišić, 2010, p. 18).
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EU countries. Within the theoretical framework of the Global South, the main goal 
of this research is to identify which soft power resources the Brazilian and Indian 
embassies in EU countries use on their official websites, and to compare which dif-
ferent digital tools and platforms they use. The research was done in 2019, so con-
tent analyzed to answer RQ1, 2 and 4 corresponds with that year. To answer RQ3 
we analyzed content published in 2018, and the analysis was possible only for Bra-
zil since Indian communication praxis does not include the date of publication (see 
chapter 4 of this paper). The research questions are:
RQ1:  Which social networks and applications do the Brazilian and Indian em-
bassies in EU countries use to inform and communicate with different 
audiences?
RQ2:  Which activities of the Brazilian and Indian embassies in EU countries 
(with an aim to brand the country) are present as a category or subca-
tegory in the main menu and in the special banners on the home pages 
of the embassies’ websites?
RQ3:  Which cultural soft power resources were dominantly communicated 
in promotion of Brazil on the embassies’ websites in EU countries in 
2018?
RQ4:  Which soft power resources are dominantly communicated in promo-
tion of India on the embassies’ websites in EU countries?
We used quantitative content analysis (Holsti, 1969; Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe et 
al., 2014) to analyze the usage of social media, social networks, mobile platforms, 
and applications usage, and to analyze categories and subcategories of the main 
menu and special banners on the embassies’ home pages. The results are presented 
with the use of descriptive statistics. To analyze the associated content under the 
categories and subcategories in the main menu and under the special banners on the 
home pages, as well as to analyze cultural events promoted on the Brazilian embas-
sies’ websites in 2018, we used thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) which helped us 
to organize different topics into clusters. A thematic analysis was also used to code 
information published about selected events in which a soft power resource was 
identified. The use of soft power resources was contextualized qualitatively.
This paper consists of an introduction, four sections and a conclusion. The first 
section provides a theoretical overview of the role of soft power and the digital tools 
within public diplomacy, the second section provides an overview of Brazil and 
India as major Global South emerging powers, the third section elaborates the use 
of soft power and digital diplomacy of Brazil and India, while the fourth section 
analyses Brazilian and Indian websites of their embassies in EU countries. The con-
clusion summarizes the research results and provides an evaluation of their attempts 
to attract European citizens through soft power.
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1. The Role of Soft Power and Digital Tools within Public Diplomacy
According to Paul Sharp public diplomacy is “the process by which direct relations 
with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values 
of those being represented” (as cited in Melissen, 2005, p. 106). In international re-
lations (IR) the role of public diplomacy, among others, is to brand the country3 and 
the nation through its natural beauties, people, historical heritage, culture and arts, 
sports, but also through finance, the economy, and commercial brands. Its role is to 
strategically manage communication towards targeted publics in different countries 
with the main objective to inform and influence them.
Joseph Nye (2011) states that IR theories identify three categories of power – 
military, economic and ideological-cultural. However, politicians often neglect the 
latter which is of equal importance as the first two. The first two are recognized 
as hard power, while the third one is coined as soft power. The right combination 
of hard and soft power Nay considers to be smart power because of “the ability to 
combine hard- and soft-power resources into effective strategies” (Nye, 2013, p. 1).
Figure 1. Association of Behavioral Types and Features of Hard and Soft Power
HARD POWER SOFT POWER
Spectrum 
of behavior Command ⇦ Coercion ⇦ Inducement




Force and                         Payments
sanctions                          Bribes
                                            Values
      Institutions                 Culture 
                                            Policies
Source: Nye (2011, p. 8), adapted by Rabêlo Neto & de Sousa Filho (2016, p. 38)
In the case of soft power, the ideological and cultural influence seems to be the 
most significant one when we try to convince others to do something (Nye, 2011). 
3 Some scholars, like Abdulsamet Günek (2018), believe that even the branding of states can 
be considered as a sort of public diplomacy since states with stronger soft power have stron-
ger brand value. Günek concludes that “the country brand has become an important tool of soft 
power” (Ibid., p. 253).
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The goal of soft power diplomacy is to shape the preference of a targeted audience 
and to produce attraction, to entice and to move people by argument (Nye, 1990; 
2008). “In international politics they are the values a country expresses through its 
culture, through its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its re-
lations with others” (Car, Kos-Stanišić & Viduka, 2016, p. 1215). Soft power can 
be defined as “the ability to get others to want, or accept, what you want” (Vuving, 
2009, p. 5). A country’s sources of soft power are its culture (high culture for the 
elite and popular culture for mass audiences), political values and foreign policies 
(Madhavi, 2008). Public diplomacy was preceded by cultural diplomacy, which in 
the words of Milton Cummings is “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other 
aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding” 
(Goff, 2013, p. 2). Still, no matter how many similarities and overlaps they have, it is 
not possible to equate public diplomacy with cultural diplomacy. According to Goff 
“cultural diplomacy sits on a spectrum of ideational approaches to diplomacy and is 
on the soft power side of the equation since it functions by attraction” (Ibid., p. 3).
The main role of foreign policy, conceived as public policy, is to meet the 
needs of the population, and target national interests, and its principles are to be in-
clusive, democratic, and participatory. Therefore, soft power diplomacy is “particu-
larly relevant for middle powers” (Bry, 2017, p. 1) that are “neither great nor small 
in terms of international power, capacity and influence” (Jordaan, 2003, p. 165), or 
those that are “below that of a superpower, or of a great power, but with sufficient 
ability to shape international events” (Britannica.com, 2020). Middle powers’ style 
of diplomacy has been labelled “niche diplomacy”, because they can pursue just 
limited foreign-policy objectives (Ibid.). 
According to María Luisa Azpíroz (2014, p. 2), in the context of globalization, 
the digital information and communication revolution and the larger influence of 
civil society in international relations, public diplomacy has evolved into a “new 
public diplomacy”, which has an approach that is more social. The development 
of digital technologies transposes diplomatic communication to digital informa-
tion and communication platforms, and especially to social networks and social 
media. Therefore, the practices and the context of public diplomacy have become 
influenced by the availability of these new digital platforms (Hayden, 2018, p. 1). 
A new challenge for foreign policy makers is to accept technology as a leading fac-
tor towards new forms of public action that influences the way countries implement 
their foreign policy strategies. These new approaches in diplomatic communication 
are called digital diplomacy (Hayden, 2018). Digital diplomacy or eDiplomacy re-
fers to the use of the Internet and information and communication platforms (so-
cial media, social networks and mobile applications) to help achieve foreign policy 
objectives (Natarajan, 2014). Ilan Manor & Elad Segev (2015) noted two levels of 
digital diplomacy. The first one comes from the foreign ministry, and the second 
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one is from the embassies located around the world. According to Bjola (2015, p. 
4-6), over the last 10 years, new digital information technologies, and especially so-
cial networks, have revolutionized the way diplomacy works. It is an absolute must 
for diplomats to have competences in three areas – representation, negotiation, and 
communication – while taking in consideration the fact that lately, communication 
is becoming the most prominent and it changes the process and the diplomatic pro-
fession (Aguirre Azócar & Erlandsen, 2018).
Academic papers that analyze “digital diplomacy 2.0”4 focus on the use of so-
cial networks and social media in diplomacy and can lead to the conclusion that 
public diplomacy which utilizes only the digital technology of the world wide web 
(www) could be considered as “digital diplomacy 1.0”. Kent and Taylor (1998) 
concluded that the world wide web facilitated the acceptance of two-sided dialog 
with an exchange of views and ideas between a given organization and the public. 
Furthermore, they offer five principles (preconditions) that are necessary to cre-
ate a “web-based relationship”.5 Digital diplomacy 1.0 represented the conceptual 
change since ministries of foreign affairs were coerced to utilize a model that was 
completely opposite in comparison to the commonly used one: instead of being se-
cretive and instead of protecting information, ministries and diplomats in general 
had to become open and to share information. Thus, ministries of foreign affairs 
were coerced to “adopt dialogic models of communication as opposed to monologic 
ones” (Kampf, Manor & Segev, 2015, p. 332).
At the end of the second decade of the 21st century the websites of ministries 
of foreign affairs and those of diplomatic missions of different states contain links 
that lead to social networks (connect with us) thus representing an “entry ticket” to 
the higher level – level 2.0 – of digital diplomacy. Still, diplomacy is very slow, and 
has been very conservative in adopting new digital information and communica-
tion platforms. Traditional diplomacy methods remain, no matter how much digital 
diplomacy has been presented to be beneficiary in the promotion of transparency, 
accountability and more efficient interaction between countries.
2. Brazil and India as Major Global South Emerging Powers 
and EU Strategic Partners
During the Cold War, the world was divided into the First, the Second, and the Third 
World. Western capitalist developed states, spearheaded by the US, belonged to the 
4 The term was launched in 2007 when a few states, through their ministries of foreign affairs, 
conducted an experiment, while nowadays the use of digital technologies in diplomacy is a glo-
bal phenomenon (Manor, 2017).
5 1) dialogic loop, 2) usefulness of information provided by organizations, 3) generating return 
visits to a website, 4) interface usability, 5) conservation of visitors (Kent & Taylor, 1998). 
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First World, communist states, spearheaded by the USSR, belonged to the Second 
World, while all other underdeveloped and nonaligned states belonged to the Third 
World. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of the New World Order, 
hence the disappearance of the Second World, a change in terminology took place. 
The world was once again divided, this time into the states of the Global North and 
the states of the Global South. However, the new “great divide” was not solely geo-
graphically determined since “there are Souths in the geographic North and Norths 
in the geographic South [...] the South represents an internal periphery and subaltern 
regional position” (Garland Mahler, 2017, p. 1). The designation “Global” meant 
just that, thus rectifying Brandt’s simplified classification of states in the world,6 
on which the new terminology was based. Siba Grovogui (2011, p. 157) thinks that 
“the Global South captures the spirit of Third World engagements”. Dirlik (2007) 
compares the suggestion that the “South must invent itself and acquire visibility on 
the global scene” with “the philosophy of self-help”. The term Global South is not 
static, thus in accordance with geopolitical changes it changes its meaning and the 
states that belong to it, thereby implying that there is no exact division of the states 
in the world (Wolvers et al., 2015). 
The term Global South has political weight with positive and negative connota-
tions. Alvaro Mendez (2015, p. 15) emphasizes the positive or rather the empower-
ing aspects. The combined economic output of three leading economies of the Glob-
al South – Brazil, India, and China – in 2019 was 2 trillion less than the economic 
output of the leading state of the Global North – the US.7 “This surge of the emerg-
ing economies is now in process of reconfiguring the political and economic geo-
metry of the international system [...] to reshape – both the formal and the informal 
institution of global governance” (Mendez, 2015, p. 15). This phenomenon of coope-
ration between the emerging economies of the Global South, hence “South-South 
cooperation”, was to be facilitated by BRICS and especially IBSA. Flemes (2009, 
p. 403) stated that “soft balancing based on a value-driven middle power discourse 
is a suitable concept to explain IBSA’s strategy in global institutions” because their 
goal was “to create rules and institutions of global governance”. After the starting 
zest during the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century in trying to represent 
one of the bodies of global governance which would bring change to global politi-
6 The terms South and North were popularized by the Brandt Commission established in 1977 
on the suggestion of the World Bank. In the early 1980s the Commission published reports in 
which the world was divided into the more developed (richer) which was situated, except for 
Australia and New Zealand, on the northern hemisphere, and the less developed (poorer) which 
was situated south of the 30th parallel (Dirlik, 2007).
7 GDP Nominal Ranking 2019: 1. USA – 21.4 trillion USD; 2. China – 14.51 trillion USD; 
5. India – 2.9 trillion USD; 9. Brazil – 1.8 trillion USD (Statisticstimes.com, 2019). 
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cal economy and foster the reform of the UN’s Security Council, it later came to a 
standstill which nowadays has resulted in IBSA loosing its importance.8 Economi-
cally, all three states competed with each other to enlarge their piece of the export pie 
on the markets of the Global North, while India and Brazil contested each other for 
the potential position of a permanent member of the Security Council (Taylor, 2009). 
Despite the wish to cooperate, they were “natural” competitors. 
While in the 1960s and 1970s both India and Brazil were “self-identifying as 
middle powers”, in the 21st century each country “re-branded itself through public 
diplomacy” (Cooper, 2009, p. 29). 
According to Maslova and Entin (2019) the BRICS group is no longer “the 
simple acronym” but a global political player. Scholars still consider Brazil to be 
a middle power – an emerging (Jordaan, 2003) or global (Malamud, 2011) one. 
While the status of India is more contested, is it an “emerging great power” because 
it possesses the hard power (nuclear power, the size of the country, and large popu-
lation). “India’s economic growth and de-facto recognition of the status of nuclear 
power influenced the attitudes of the international public about India as ‘an emerg-
ing power with expanding global clout’” (Ritambhara, 2013, p. 1, as cited in Car, 
Kos-Stanišić & Viduka, 2016, p. 1215-1216). India is very often seen as a “nearly-
power that cannot quite get its acts together” although it would have much to offer 
(The Economist, 2013) or “A Would-Be Great Power” which “resists its own rise” 
(Miller, 2013). In his multi-book essay Will India Ever Emerge as a Great Power? 
Sumit Ganguly (2018) concludes that India has the potential to emerge as a great 
power, but if India’s political institutions will not cope with the extraordinary range 
of societal demands it will always be country of the future.
Brazil and India are emerging Global South powers, mutual strategic partners 
(Costa Vazquez, 2019) and strategic partners of the EU as well. The EU commits 
special attention to their strategic partnership which “seem to constitute a crucial 
part of its increasingly eclectic approaches to tackling the globalized multipolar 
world” (Ferreira-Pereira & Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, 2016, p. 3). 
Diplomatic relations between Brazil and the EC/EU were established in 1960 
and they blossomed in 2007 with the establishment of the strategic partnership 
(more in Kos-Stanišić, 2016). Brazil is the largest and economically the most im-
portant Latin American country with the unique position as a regional power, one 
of the leaders of the developing world and emerging world power as well. Brazil is 
the only Latin American country which cooperates with the EU on all three levels: 
as a member of The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 
on the bi-regional level, as a member of The Southern Common Market (MECO-
8 IBSA placed their hopes on BRICS because Russia and China are members of the Security 
Council, but BRICS proved to be a disappointment on this issue (Bhatia, 2019).
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SUR) on the sub-regional level, and as a country which has signed the agreement 
on Strategic Partnership with the EU. The main forum of communication between 
Brazil and the EU were summits that were supposed to be held every second year, 
but the last one was held in 2014, so it is easy to assume that EU-Brazil partner-
ship has lost enthusiasm. Although Brazil and the EU do not have any existential 
conflict of interests or values, but share a common cultural heritage, Miriam Gomes 
Saraiv (2019) concludes that “the strategic EU-Brazil partnership is deactivated”. 
Still, the EU is economically an important market for Brazilian goods, especially 
for raw materials, food, drink, or energy. In 2018 Brazil was the EU’s 11th largest 
imports partner and the 16th largest exports partner. In 2018 the Netherlands was the 
largest EU importer of goods from Brazil (€6 billion), while Germany was the lar-
gest exporter to Brazil (€9 billion) (Ec.europa.eu, 2019). Regarding the cooperation 
between the EU and Brazil, it is important to mention that issues of environmental 
protection and human rights have been very highly ranked, while after the ascend-
ance to power in 2019 of right-wing president Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, the relations 
between two parties have grown colder. 
Bilateral relations between India and the EU were launched in 1962, and dur-
ing 1990s the Cooperation Agreement was signed. Thanks to the “multi-tiered in-
stitutional dialogue” in the form of India-EU summits the bilateral relations were 
somewhat improved (Ahuja, 2019). In 2004 India became the EU’s strategic part-
ner, but relations did not fully live up to their expectations. As we mentioned be-
fore, the EU envisioned India as a “poor big” country, and not as a great civilization 
(Singh, 2012, as cited in Malhotra, 2015, p. 5), while India envisioned the EU as a 
“has-been” power, and not of a greater significance to Asia (Günek, 2018). Under 
the governance of Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi (since 2014) India-EU rela-
tions have improved. Modi realized the soft power potential of India’s diaspora in 
the EU, which could spread positive information and advocate India’s interests. In 
2015 a five-year plan for strategic cooperation (The Agenda for Action 2020) was 
adopted and stipulated a better and more successful cooperation in matters of fo-
reign and security policy, especially when it comes to counter-terrorism and cyber 
security. Furthermore, at the end of 2018 the document Elements of a new strategy 
for relations with India was adopted and it recommends a further deepening of the 
strategic cooperation. The EU is the most significant trading partner of India and the 
second largest investor in India. “In the challenging regional and international en-
vironment, the EU and India share the values of democracy, human rights, and fun-
damental freedoms and support the rule-based global order centered on multilate-
ralism. Both represent ‘unions of diversity’ and have important stake in each other’s 
prosperity and sustainable development” (EEAS, 2018). Iwanek (2019) states that 
during Modi’s turn as PM, India has been mostly interested in dealing with France, 
Germany and the UK within the EU member states.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, 2021, pp. 113-140
122
3. Brazilian and Indian use of soft power and digital diplomacy 
As already mentioned, soft power is very important for middle powers, especially 
for an emerging one such as Brazil, but it is also important for an “emerging great 
power” such as India. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) with his 
global policy diplomacia presidencial put Brazil back on the international stage. 
However, only during Lula da Silva’s government (2003-2010), and thanks to the 
use of its soft power potentials, Brazil was accepted as a major international actor 
(Bry, 2017). According to Hurrell (2010, p. 60), in the beginning of his term Lula 
stated that Brazil had been not only a pathetic “small” Latin American country of 
the Third World that had street children and citizens that only know how to play 
football and to enjoy the Carnival – but Brazil has had so much more to offer.9 
According to Lula: “This country has greatness...” (Ibid.). 
Mathilde Chatin (2016, p. 370) stresses that “Brazil naturally exercises soft 
power” and looking through Brazilian culture and its impact, the country’s image 
is originally positive, and it is especially tolerance and racial issues that are recog-
nized as important issues that Brazil copes with well. Brazil relies on soft power 
to spread information and knowledge on Brazilian values and its worldview. This 
approach consolidates Brazil’s “position as a global political soft power-player in 
the international political arena” which is key to success in connecting Brazil with 
global publics (Ibid., p. 384).
According to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA, commonly 
known as the Itamaraty) the concept of Brazilian public diplomacy “has been tra-
ditionally associated with the promotion of a country’s image abroad” (Itamaraty.
gov.br, 2019) Beside this traditional view, in Brazil, public diplomacy is recognized 
also as a tool for a greater openness of Brazilian foreign policy to international 
publics, “to promote democratization and transparency of national public policies” 
(Ibid.). The role of Itamaraty communication through digital media has reinforced 
the efforts of public diplomacy in Brazil to promote accountability to society and to 
receive comments and suggestions that contribute to the formulation of public poli-
cies attentive to the evolution of national aspirations. 
As stated before, it is believed that soft power is especially relevant for the 
middle powers in the international arena. Brazil holds the status of a middle power 
on two of the most important platforms – South-South cooperation and increased 
presence in international “events”. 
In the post-industrial economies, culture has become one of the fastest grow-
ing sectors, integrating with the service and leisure sector (Werthein, 2003, as cited 
in Rabêlo Neto & de Sousa Filho, 2016). Soft power has the ideological power to 
9 According to UNESCO Brazil has 22 World Heritage Sites (Whc.unesco.org, 2019a). 
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unite society, and culture captures it (soft power). According to Azpíroz (2015), 
Brazilian cultural diplomacy engaged in actions related to education, science, and 
culture with an objective to share knowledge and to promote values and dialogue 
in general. Thus, the promotion of cultural production has a great potential to reach 
international audiences, and that is why culture can be an instrument of ideologi-
cal power. Although the Brazilian government had recognized the power of culture 
diplomacy in the early 1920s (Dumont & Flechet, 2014) and kept developing this 
approach in diplomacy, Brazil was not recognized as an important global player 
before the beginning of the 21st century. Since then, Brazil’s presence in global dis-
cussions has become highlighted, while the Brazilian government focused on cul-
ture as one of the main tools of soft power diplomacy. The image of a country is its 
power, soft power. Over the last decades, the image of Brazil has become glo-
bally recognized as a very positive, “a happy, multicultural, multiracial, friendly, 
welcoming place and tolerant country fond of parties, high-spirited and exuberant 
in nature” (Ballerini, 2020). However, according to the Portland Soft Power Index 
(Softpower30.com, 2019), Brazil is losing its “power of seduction”. After a year-
on-year decline on the Soft Power 30 Index, Brazil arrested its slide at the position 
of 29th in 2018, while in 2015 Brazil was 23rd. According to Ballerini (2020), cur-
rently the most famous Brazilian soft power sources of carnival, bossa nova and 
soap operas, not to mention football, are under threat.10
Gandhi and Nehru emphasized the importance of the soft power of India and 
they used it in the global anti-colonial movement and later the Non-Aligned Move-
ment (Car, Kos-Stanišić & Viduka, 2016, p. 1215). Public diplomacy was recog-
nized in India as a crucial instrument that the government can use “to mobilize its 
culture, political values and foreign policies to communicate with and attract the 
public and government of foreign countries” (Nye, 2008, p. 95). 
India’s Public Diplomacy Division of MFA established in 2006 is “the only one 
of a host of players engaged in deliberate or incidental projection of soft power” 
(Suri, 2011, p. 299), but has been aimed “more at shaping global image then in-
fluencing the foreign policy attitudes of foreign publics [...] blurring public diplo-
macy with public relations” (Hanson, 2012). According to Kalathmika Natarajan a 
crucial task for countries seeking influence is “providing information and creating 
favorable knowledge about the country, its policies, and its future role” (Natarajan, 
2014, p. 91). Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) tries to maximize the use of new 
technologies. It considers the Internet as a digital space that enables two-sided com-
munication with the younger publics within and outside of India. India is trying to 
sell its “better story” by the means of digital diplomacy, and the best example for 
10 More about Brazilian soft power under Bolsonaro in Ballerini, 2020.
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that is the website PDD (www.indiandiplomacy.in) which represents the virtual ar-
chive of India’s soft power reach. India’s diplomacy is very much active on social 
media as well. Natarajan (2014, p. 100) believes that India’s public diplomacy “has 
revolved around an overwhelming emphasis on soft power” and that India’s politi-
cal elites should resist these urges. India should not only deal in the promotion of 
cultural campaigns and tourism, rather it should communicate its political decisions 
and goals as well.11
According to Malhotra, India’s soft power resources are spiritual heritage, the 
movie industry, cuisine, the IT industry, scientific achievements, and India’s emer-
gence as a global innovation hub (Malhotra, 2015, pp. 2-3). Mukherjee’s (2014, p. 
48, as cited in Car, Kos-Stanišić & Viduka, 2016, p. 1216) list of India’s soft power 
resources is longer: “sports, music, art, film, literature, beauty pageantry, anti-colo-
nial history, democratic institutions, free press, independent judiciary, vibrant civil 
society, multi-ethnic polity, secularism, pluralism, skilled English-speaking workers, 
food, handcrafts, yoga, status of responsible nuclear power, Bangalore (IT sector), 
large diaspora”.12 In India, film and Bollywood13 have been the most influential tools 
of promoting the country’s national culture, heritage14 and tradition (Kaur, 2002). 
Bollywood plays an important role in enhancing India’s image in Europe. Shashi 
Tharoor, the former Union Minister of State for External Affairs, was one of the 
greatest advocates of India’s soft power as it was embodied in film and Bollywood, 
yoga, ayurveda, political pluralism, religious diversity, and openness to global influ-
ence (Barrel, 2012, p. 29, as cited in Car, Kos-Stanišić & Viduka, 2016, p. 1216). 
Dhruva Jaishankar (2018) believes that India is an example of a state that uses 
its soft power potentials poorly, and therefore it is not included on the Soft Power 30 
11 Since India’s goal is to become a permanent member of the reformed Security Council, it 
should communicate its extraordinary involvement in the UN’s peace-keeping operations, and 
how it voted and debated in the UN during the adoption of important decisions (Natarajan, 2014, 
p. 100).
12 India is one among only 11 countries to create, in 2004, a Diaspora Ministry called the Mini-
stry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) that serves to “promote, nurture and sustain a mutually 
beneficial and symbiotic relationship between India and overseas Indians” (MOIA, 2004). Mo-
dern diasporas are “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host coun-
tries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin – their 
homelands” (Sheffer, 1986).
13 Bollywood is the name for India’s Hindi film industry and it was declared the Indian film in-
dustry in 1998. Since then it has been considered an important means of propaganda to promote 
India’s foreign policy goals (see more in Schaefer & Karan, 2015; Maheshwari, 2013). 
More on Bollywood as a tool of Indian soft power diplomacy in Car, Kos-Stanišić & Viduka, 
2016.
14 According to UNESCO India has 38 World Heritage Sites (Whc.unesco.org, 2019b).
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Index. The author names several reasons for that – low per capita, bad state-driven 
cultural diffusion, India’s achievements quite often not even connected to India, 
and “in many cases India’s appeal is to others in the developing world rather than to 
high-value or prestigious markets” (Ibid., para. 7).
In historical terms, according to Daya Kishan Thussu (2013, p. 10) Indian soft 
power was more focused on the rest of the world, and less upon the West. Tharoor 
emphasized how important it is for the state, instead of having a strong army and 
economy, to be able to “sell a better story” (Tharoor, 2011). In his view “hard power 
is exercised; soft power is evoked” and “soft power is not about conquering others, 
but about being yourself” (Ibid., pp. 3-6). Soft power is not just what we put on dis-
play, but also how others see us (Ibid., p. 8). 
4. The Analysis of Web Pages of the Brazilian and Indian Embassies 
in EU Countries
Brazil has embassies in 24 EU member states. In four EU countries Brazil does not 
have an embassy – Latvia is represented in the embassy in Sweden, Lithuania is 
represented in the embassy in Denmark, Luxemburg is represented in the embassy 
in Belgium, and Malta is represented in the embassy in the Vatican. Indian embas-
sies are also present in 24 EU member states. Estonia is represented in the embassy 
in Finland, Latvia is represented in Sweden, Luxemburg is represented in Belgium, 
while Lithuania is represented in Poland.
We coded all the Brazilian embassies’ websites. There were some obstacles in 
coding the Indian embassies’ websites. Firstly, in Indian digital communication it 
is not a standard to add the date of publishing, so it was impossible to do the time 
selection of published articles. Secondly, it was impossible to conduct a search on 
the Indian embassies’ websites, and we realized that instead of publishing written 
information, in Indian public diplomacy they prefer publishing pictures and links to 
YouTube videos (without voiceover) without giving the context, or any textual in-
formation to explain the picture. Therefore, only RQ1 and RQ2 apply to both coun-
tries, while RQ3 applies only to Brazil, and RQ4 applies only to India.
Digital Diplomacy 2.0 or Digital Diplomacy 1.0?
Digital diplomacy is becoming a standard in tailoring foreign-policy and in commu-
nicating nation-branding messages to local publics which have some unique charac-
teristics. At the beginning of this research, following the research results of Kampf, 
Manor and Segev (2015), we wanted to find out if the Internet website remains the 
dominant platform to publish information related to an embassy’s activities and oth-
er topics and events recognized as important in communicating Brazilian and Indian 
foreign policy. The analysis of the digital information communication options of the 
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Brazilian and Indian embassies in EU countries shows the large difference between 
these two countries.
The Brazilian MFA (Itamaraty) dedicated a lot of attention to its online pre-
sence and its diversification. They launched profiles on social media platforms, and 
they established channels in different languages. The MFA is active on YouTube, 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Flickr, SoundCloud and is involved in blogging. The 
digital activity differs a lot from one embassy to another. Facebook has become an 
important tool used to connect with local publics and Brazilian communities abroad. 
Still, for Brazilian embassies, their websites remain the dominant source of 
communication with the publics. All embassies’ websites are standardized, follow-
ing the same visual design, and the same information organization template. On 
the other hand, the Brazilian embassies’ presence on social networks is still unstan-
dardized. It mostly relies on Facebook (17 of 24 embassies), with some use of You-
Tube as a distribution platform for the video promotion of the country (7 embas-
sies), and of Twitter (6 embassies). 
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ (MEA) approach is much more ori-
ented towards the use of digital technologies and social media platforms to engage 
with the publics. The Indian embassies’ websites are visually standardized but are 
not standardized at the level of content and information organization. Still, the pro-
motion of social networks and other mobile platforms that the embassy uses follows 
the same design template. Since 2010 they have been using @IndianDiplomacy 
Twitter account, followed in 2011 with @MEAIndia as the official Twitter chan-
nel for the Spokesperson of the Ministry (MEA, 2019). The MEA India Facebook 
page was created in 2012, while a mobile application “MEA App” was launched in 
2013 (Ibid.). MEA maintains two YouTube channels (MEA India and Indian Di-
plomacy), and accounts on various platforms like Instagram, Flickr, Google+ and 
SoundCloud. In 2017 a profile on LinkedIn was created (Ibid.). Indian embassies 
fully embraced the social media sphere where they digitally communicate with their 
mobile and networked publics. One of the possible reasons why India is ahead of 
Brazil is that India is famous for its IT sector, especially Bangalore which is known 
as the Silicon Valley of India.
To engage in a comparative analysis of the research data, we kept the research 
focus exclusively on the content published on embassies’ websites, being aware that 
such decision is a limitation of this study when it comes to India.
Brazilian and Indian Featured Topics
The visual identity of the Brazilian and Indian embassies’ websites is standardized; 
still, the embassies do not follow the same content organization in all EU countries. 
In some countries, websites are organized completely the same, following the same 
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main menu and organization of categories, while in other countries there are some 
minor or major differences. In order to answer RQ2 (which activities of Brazilian 
and Indian embassies in EU countries (with an aim to brand the country) are present 
as a category or subcategory in the main menu and in the special banners at home 
pages of the embassies’ websites?), all 48 home pages were analyzed, and many 
similarities between Brazil and India were recognized (Graphs 2 and 3 on pages 
128 and 129). 
The websites’ main menu categories and subcategories were analyzed using 
thematic analysis, and they were coded into seven main clusters: Political Sector; 
Economy and Commerce; Tourism; Culture and Art; Education; Sport; Environ-
mentalism. The clusters largely corresponded to the sources that public diplomacy 
uses to brand the state.
The category of economy and commerce (including trade and investments) is 
the most present category in the public diplomacy of both countries (22-23%), fol-
lowed with very similar proportion of tourism, culture and art, and education (15-
22%). There is only a small difference in political issues which are slightly less pre-
sent on the Brazilian embassies’ websites (16%) comparing to Indian (22%). 
It is interesting that the environmental issues (climate change, ecology) are 
completely ignored on the Indian embassies’ websites, and hardly present on 
Graph 1. Indian and Brazilian Embassies Presence on Social Media and Mobile 
Application
Source: Data collected from websites of Indian and Brazilian embassies in EU countries 
in November 2019. 
N (India) = 24; N (Brazil) = 24.
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Brazil’s (4%). But, as we mentioned before, one of the purposes of public diploma-
cy, besides drawing a positive image, is to hide “or remain unnoticed for the darker 
side of their social reality” (Melissen, 2013, p. 7). The fact is that, after Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, India is the third most polluted country in the world. Pollution is the 
product of traffic, fossil fuel burning power plants, heavy industries, and the burn-
ing of agricultural stubble (BBC, 2019). Brazil is famous for its ownership of “the 
lungs of the world”, the world’s biggest rainforest and the most biodiverse place in 
the world – the Amazon, and also infamous for its deforestation. Although the Bra-
zilian government was trying to control deforestation, unfortunately it is losing the 
battle.
Sport is better recognized in Brazilian public diplomacy as a tool to promote 
the country and it is especially related to the promotion of the Rio 2016 Olympic 
Games. We expected to see more football and Brazilian football players used as a 
resource of soft power diplomacy, especially because Brazil hosted 2014 World 
Cup, but it remains invisible. Indian embassies generally have no sports promoted 
on their web pages, maybe because the most popular Indian sport is cricket which, 
besides in the UK, is not practiced in EU countries. But they emphasize yoga which 
was, in the case of four countries, promoted as a special category of the main menu.
Brazilian Contemporary Film as a Digital Soft Power Tool 
To identify Brazil’s cultural soft power tools, we analyzed all the cultural events 
published on the Brazilian embassies’ websites in 2018. As we mentioned before, 
Graph 2. BRAZIL: Main Menu and Special Banners Categories; N=104









soft power is ideologically-culturally oriented and cultural influence seems to be the 
most important when a country is trying to attract international publics. News and 
events are published in chronological order. Using thematic analysis all published 
texts about cultural events were coded into 10 clusters (film; concerts and dance; 
visual art exhibitions; festivals and art fairs; literature; photography; theatre; culture 
and art workshops; Carnival; other). After the quantitative analysis (Graph 4 on the 
next page), in the qualitative section of the research we focused on film and music 
events (concerts and dance) as they were the most published (film 35%, concerts 
and dance 32%). We expected that Brazilian embassies will use Carnival as one of 
the main touristic selling point of Brazil because it could be used as a soft power 
tool, but it was present in only 2% of the published articles.
In Italy, Germany and Croatia the Brazilian embassies’ activities were largely 
focused on film promotion. In 2018 the Brazilian embassy in Italy organized or pro-
moted 51 film screenings, film days, or film festivals; in Germany there were 17 
such events, and in Croatia 15.15 The question is – why was it film that was selected 
15 There is the Brazilian-Italian Cultural Centre in Rome which organizes regular film screenings 
every month, and these are promoted on the Brazilian embassy’s website. The name of the program 
is Cinema Brasileiro. All the movies were produced in the 2000s. Through the FIBRA (Italian-
Brazilian Cultural Foundation) cinema is promoted as one of the six major cultural grounds, and 
the objectives are to promote Brazilian film, especially contemporary Brazilian film with the new 
generation of directors, to organize debates about the evolution of Brazilian film, and to support 
and promote the Brazilian films in film festivals organized in Italy (FIBRA, 2019). In Germany 

















to become Brazil’s digital diplomacy 1.0 soft power tool? According to Dennison 
and Meleiro (2016, p. 18), at the beginning of the 21st century the audio-visual indus-
try was recognized as a pillar of Brazilian national culture. The production of Bra-
zilian feature films (and international co-productions) grew from 29 films in 2002 
to 127 in 2013 (ANCINE, 2012). The Brazilian government recognized the impor-
tance of promotion of the film industry and it included it in the 2012 Plano Brasil 
Maior (Plan for a Greater Brazil) – the national strategy for industry, technology, 
services, and foreign trade (Ibid.). The Brazilian Government supported it through 
“the expansion and diversification of public investments; fiscal incentives for pri-
vate investment; tax benefits for broadcasting services and importation of equip-
ment; establishment of credit lines; purchase of institutional advertising space; and 
investment in channels for public television” (Dennison & Meleiro, 2016, p. 18). 
Further, a close dialogue with main cinema industries in Europe has been encou-
raged, and as a result Brazil signed co-production agreements with Germany, Italy, 
and France – countries that host the festivals with the most important and the most 
contemporary Brazilian film screenings and film evenings are organized at least once a month and 
promoted on the embassy’s website. In Croatia film screenings are organized once a month inside 
the embassy, and there is a week of Brazilian film organized in Zagreb in cooperation with local 
cinemas Tuškanac and Kinoteka.
Graph 4. Brazilian Cultural Events in 2018 Published on Embassies Websites; N=271
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prestigious prizes in the world (the Golden Bear in Berlin, the Golden Lion at Ve-
nice, and the Golden Palm at the Cannes Festival) (Ibid., p. 22).
Regarding music and dance, in 2018 there were a total of 86 events promoted 
on the Brazilian embassies’ websites, but 72 of them (almost 84%) were published 
in Germany. These music events consist of all kinds of music, including classical 
music concerts performed by Brazilian artists, or Brazilian contemporary music 
concerts performed by singers or bands. No special pattern was recognized and 
could be coded as a cluster in thematic analysis. On the other hand, when it comes 
to music, samba dominated. Samba is “the most famous” music and dance, “cha-
racterized by 2/4 meter and interlocking, syncopated lines in melody and accompa-
niment” (McGowan & Pessanha, 2009) which has according to Goldschmitt (2019) 
the potential to be globally recognized as a Brazilian brand. Samba dance perfor-
mances and samba dance courses were promoted on the embassies’ websites, still 
samba was rarely related to the Rio Carnival. 
Our findings are consistent with Henrickson (2005) that Brazilian cultural di-
plomacy in the EU is “niche diplomacy” which Brazil practices in order to diver-
sify its modes of political influence, targeting different societal and geographical 
areas within the EU. Our findings are consistent with other scholars (Zismann & 
Geisler, 2013, as cited in Rabêlo Neto & de Sousa Filho, 2016) who had recognized 
film as a powerful tool because “it plays an active role in the formation of identi-
ties and international realities”. Azpíroz states that cultural diplomacy has a poten-
tial to become one of Brazil’s main assets on the EU diplomatic scene and a cru-
cial element of its public diplomacy because it has a lot of social components and 
it “promotes messages in a tangible way, through concrete projects and activities” 
(Azpíroz, 2015, p. 20).
Indian Yoga as a Digital Soft Power Tool 
As explained before, because the publishing dates of news and information are 
missing, we could not code news published on the Indian embassies’ websites and 
compare it with Brazilian data. That is why we decided to analyze only the informa-
tion and news published under the main categories and subcategories of the main 
menu where cultural soft power elements were identified. At the beginning of the 
research, because of India’s fourth position on the list of leading film box office 
markets in 2019,16 we expected to see Bollywood as at least one of the most im-
portant soft power resources used to promote Indian national culture, heritage, and 
tradition. However, on the embassies’ websites no category, subcategory or special 
16 India shares the fourth position with UK, South Korea and France with 1.6 billion USD re-
venue, while the first three markets are U.S./Canada (11.4 billion USD), China (9.3 billion USD) 
and Japan (2.4 billion USD) (Statista, 2020).
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banner that appeared promoted Indian film. Information about Indian film festivals 
and screenings are placed deep into the archives of news which are not possible to 
track, and impossible to search as there is no search option. 
On the other hand, there is a dominance of yoga-related events on the Indian 
embassies’ websites. In some countries (Belgium, Poland, and Spain) yoga is even a 
special category in the main menu. In Belgium, all information is related exclusive-
ly towards the International Day of Yoga (IDY) in 2015, 2016 and 2017. Although 
no information was added for 2018 and 2019, we found them inside the news sec-
tion. In Poland, the main menu category is “Yoga and Ayurveda”, and besides pro-
moting the IDY celebrations, there is a link to the Ministry of AYUSH (Ministry 
of Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy) which was 
formed in 2014. In Spain, the title of the main menu category is “Yoga Corner” 
where yoga practicing is promoted, and a subcategory is devoted to IDY. Although 
other countries do not have yoga as a special category, yoga is widely promoted, 
especially in June when IDY is celebrated.
To contextualize, according to the information published on the analyzed web-
sites, yoga is a 5,000-year-old physical, mental, and spiritual practice with its ori-
gin in India. Gradually yoga disseminated across the globe. It was Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi who successfully lobbied the United Nations to designate 
June 21 International Day of Yoga. The United Nations General Assembly did so 
in 2014. Modi and his Hindu nationalist-led government use the ancient practice 
of yoga, together with Buddhism and the Indian diaspora, as a form of soft power 
to assert India’s rising place in the world (Mazumdar, 2018). With the UN General 
Assembly resolution, yoga received the affirmation “for the physical, mental, and 
spiritual well-being of all individuals” (Singh & Srivastava, 2014). Once consi-
dered a religious act, or something confined to Hinduism only, after this resolution 
yoga was affirmed with global significance. In 2016, the celebration of IDY was 
organized in the European Parliament17 which acts as evidence of the power of In-
dian soft power diplomacy, and yoga has become an important Indian soft power 
resource. According to information from India’s foreign ministry, most of the 191 
Indian embassies and consulates worldwide have organized yoga sessions to com-
memorate IDY. 
This Indian example shows how a government decision, with the help of fo-
reign diplomacy assets, can in a relatively short period of time (2014-2019) maxi-
mize the effect of a soft power resource such as yoga. And now, with this know-
ledge, it is understandable why all the embassies have a special banner “Healthcare 
17 Pictures are published on embassy’s webpage https://www.indianembassybrussels.gov.in/pdf/
Activity%20Report%20IYD%202015-2016_jul_27.pdf 
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Tourism”18 at the bottom of the home page. The impact of yoga is even larger as it 
is related to the philosophy mainly based on Hinduism and can be largely spread as 
a kind of lifestyle, diet preferences (veganism, vegetarianism, etc.) and alternative 
medicine approaches (e.g., ayurveda, homeopathy).
Conclusion
Brazil and India, both major Global South emerging powers, are using new pub-
lic diplomacy to rebrand themselves from undeveloped and backward countries to 
modern and attractive ones. In order to be more important in global politics, emerg-
ing Global South powers need to have partnerships with other important global 
players, especially from the Global North. The EU is an important player from the 
North, so to attract more European tourists, investments or to enhance trade, Brazil 
and India try to seduce citizens of the EU with soft power diplomacy. Besides the 
traditional way of using soft power in public diplomacy, there is also a new, digital 
way – to use soft power on the Internet and on embassies’ websites and information 
and communication platforms is considered to be digital diplomacy. 
The main objective of this research was to find out how Brazil and India use 
digital diplomacy in communication through the official websites of the Brazilian 
and Indian embassies in EU countries and to identify which soft power resources 
they dominantly use. Although digital diplomacy is becoming a standard in tailor-
ing foreign policy and in communicating country-branding messages to the local 
and global publics, the standard varies in different countries. Our research demon-
strates that the Internet website remains the dominant platform for Brazilian digital 
diplomacy in EU countries, so it could be labelled as digital diplomacy 1.0. On the 
other hand, Indian embassies fully embrace digital diplomacy 2.0 as they use social 
media, social networks and an official MEA App to communicate with their mobile 
and networked publics. 
Regarding the dominant activities the Brazilian and Indian embassies present 
as categories and subcategories in the main menu and in the special banners on the 
embassies’ home pages, we found that clusters largely corresponded to the sources 
that public diplomacy uses to brand the state, with economy and commerce domi-
nating, followed with very similar proportion of tourism, culture and art, and edu-
cation, while sport and environmentalism stay invisible. The analysis of cultural 
soft power resources shows that Brazilian digital public diplomacy focuses on film 
and music (concerts and dance), while Indian digital diplomacy focuses on yoga. 
Regarding India, yoga seems a reasonable choice since other Indian soft power re-
sources are not so attractive to European publics. But in the case of Brazil, it is not 
18 http://www.indiahealthcaretourism.com/
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clear why, besides film, Brazilian embassies did not use other soft power resources, 
very attractive to Europeans, such as Carnival, or football. 
Nevertheless, both Brazilian soft power “film diplomacy” and Indian soft po-
wer “yoga diplomacy” as a part of their digital public diplomacy in EU countries 
are not enough to attract European publics. To enhance the importance of Brazil or 
India in the field of digital diplomacy in the EU, their foreign ministries should use 
all the soft power resources appealing to Europeans, and especially in the case of 
Brazilian embassies, they could attract more citizens by switching to digital diplo-
macy 2.0.
This research has several limitations. First, we focused only on categories or 
subcategories in the main menus and in the special banners on the home pages of 
the embassies’ websites. At this stage, we did not have resources to do the complete 
text analysis of all published content during the research period. Second, we did 
not do an analysis of content communicated on social networks and applications, 
that remains as an option for the second stage of this study. Third, in the qualita-
tive part of the research we focused only on the dominant cultural soft power re-
sources of Brazil, and on yoga as a soft power resource of India. We are aware that 
in qualitative research every other resource of soft power should be recognized and 
expanded. And finally, we are aware that without a questionnaire distributed to a 
representative sample of EU citizens, it is not possible to obtain any information on 
the impact of Brazil and India’s public diplomacy through their embassies’ websites 
in EU member states. Still, these limits are a result of conscious decisions, and the 
most important one is that the embassies’ standards of publishing information are 
not the same, and therefore the published content often is not comparable. Thus, de-
spite these limitations, we find that at least some important insights have emerged 
from this preliminary research, and we hope to inspire further research on public 
diplomacy of Global South players related to the EU publics.
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